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Abstract
We analyze the relative importance of probability weighting and choice set depen-
dence in describing risky choices both non-parametrically and with a structural model.
Our experimental design uses binary choices between lotteries that may trigger Allais
Paradoxes. We change the choice set by manipulating the correlation structure of the
lotteries’ payoffs while keeping their marginal distributions constant. This allows us to
discriminate between probability weighting and choice set dependence. There are three
main results. First, probability weighting and choice set dependence both play a role in
describing aggregate choices. Second, the structural model uncovers substantial indi-
vidual heterogeneity which can be parsimoniously characterized by three types: 38% of
subjects engage primarily in probability weighting, 34% are influenced predominantly
by choice set dependence, and 28% are mostly rational. Third, the classification of
subjects into types predicts preference reversals out-of-sample. These results may not
only further our understanding of choice under risk but may also prove valuable for
describing the behavior of consumers, investors, and judges.
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1 Introduction
The past decades of mostly experimental economic research on choice under risk have re-
vealed systematic violations of expected utility theory (EUT; von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, 1953). Important examples of EUT violations fall into two categories. First, as
exposed in the famous Allais Paradoxes, most subjects tend to exhibit both both risk loving
and risk averse behavior (Allais, 1953). This category of EUT violations contradicts EUT’s
independence axiom. Second, as demonstrated by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and Lind-
man (1971), many subjects revert their preference when they have to choose between two
lotteries or evaluate them in isolation. Cox and Epstein (1989) and Loomes et al. (1991)
later showed experimentally that some forms of preference reversals contradict EUT’s tran-
sitivity axiom. These and other systematic violations of EUT have spurred the development
of various alternative decision theories.
A major class of alternative decision theories uses probability weighting to describe vi-
olations of the independence axiom. In these theories, subjects systematically overweight
small probabilities and underweight large probabilities. Consequently, subjects may display
risk loving behavior when buying a state lottery ticket and risk averse behavior when buying
damage insurance, because they overweight the small probability of winning the state lot-
tery and underweight the large probability of not suffering any damage. Prominent examples
of this class of theories are Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), subsequently
generalized to Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), as well
as Rank Dependent Utility (RDU; Quiggin, 1982).1 These theories mainly differ in the way
they account for probability weighting. For instance, RDU is silent about the origin of
probability weighting, while in CPT, it directly results from reference-dependence and the
Weber-Fechner law implying diminishing sensitivity away from reference points.
However, probability weighting cannot explain violations of the transitivity axiom. Sub-
jects never revert their preference, since they always attach the same value to lotteries,
regardless whether they have to choose among them or evaluate them in isolation.2
1When lottery payoffs are non-negative – as in this study – and subjects derive utility from lottery
payoffs rather than absolute wealth levels, CPT and RDU coincide. Another example of a theory based on
probability weighting is the model by Gul (1991) of disappointment aversion which belongs to the Chew-
Deckel class of betweenness-respecting models (Deckel, 1986; Chew, 1989). For a detailed discussion see
Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012).
2An extended version of CPT with an endogenous reference point allows for violations of transitivity
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Another major class of decision theories postulates that the evaluation of lotteries is
choice set dependent. This allows these theories to describe violations of the transitivity
axiom and, under certain conditions, also of the independence axiom. Prominent members
of this class are Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk (ST; Bordalo et al., 2012b) and
Regret Theory (RT; Loomes and Sugden, 1982).3 These theories have in common that,
when subjects evaluate lotteries, they focus their limited attention on states of the world
with large payoff differences between the alternatives. Hence, a lottery’s value is choice set
dependent as the weight attached to a state depends on the payoffs of the alternatives in
that state. The main difference between these theories is how they operationalize choice set
dependence. For example, ST respects diminishing sensitivity, as a given payoff difference
renders a state less salient the further away it is from the reference point. In contrast, RT
assumes that subjects use a convex regret function to evaluate lotteries with non-negative
payoffs. Thus, they overweight states with payoff differences located further away from the
reference point of zero – meaning that RT is at odds with diminishing sensitivity.4
Like probability weighting, choice set dependence can also explain why subjects some-
times display both risk loving and risk averse behavior. However, the intuition is different.
Subjects tend to buy state lottery tickets because they overweight the state where they win
the big prize due to the large payoff difference between winning the big prize and not buying
the ticket. At the same time, they may buy damage insurance, because they overweight the
state in which the damage occurs due to the large payoff difference between being insured
and uninsured in that particular state.
These two major classes of decision theories often make similar predictions. Nevertheless,
discriminating between them is important to better understand the behavior of various
economic agents, such as investors, consumers, and judges. For example, in contrast to
probability weighting, choice set dependence can naturally explain the counter-cyclicality of
risk premia on financial markets (Bordalo et al., 2013a) and important behavioral phenomena
(Schmidt et al., 2008). However, when subjects consider lotteries with non-negative payoffs and derive utility
from lottery payoffs rather than absolute wealth levels, the reference point is assumed to be exogenous and
equal to zero (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In that case, CPT cannot explain preference reversals.
3Other examples of choice set dependent theories are by Rubinstein (1988); Aizpurua et al. (1990); Leland
(1994); and Loomes (2010).
4We focus on ST in the present paper as the main example of a choice set dependent theory since it
respects diminishing sensitivity and fits the aggregate choices in our dataset much better than RT (see
Appendix A).
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in consumer choices (Bordalo et al., 2012a, 2013b; Dertwinkel-Kalt et al., 2017) and judicial
decisions (Bordalo et al., 2015). However, as it will become clear later, choice set dependence
can describe violations of the independence axiom and, thus, the Allais Paradoxes only
under some specific conditions. Hence, it is crucial to know the extent to which probability
weighting and choice set dependence drive subjects’ risky choices.
We address this question with a laboratory experiment which allows us to discriminate
between probability weighting and choice set dependence while controlling for EUT. First,
we provide non-parametric evidence at the aggregate level, i.e. at the level of a representative
decision maker. Second, we account for heterogeneity in a parsimonious way by estimating
a structural model which allows us to classify each subject into a type based on the decision
theory that best describes her choices. Third, we perform out-of-sample predictions to assess
the validity of this classification of subjects into types.
To discriminate between probability weighting and choice set dependence, the experi-
ment uses a series of incentivized binary choices between lotteries that may trigger Allais
Paradoxes. Every subject makes each binary choice twice. In one case, the two lotteries’
payoffs are independent of each other, while in the other, they are perfectly correlated. Note
that this manipulation of the correlation structure affects the joint payoff distribution of
the two lotteries but not their marginal payoff distributions. Hence, if choices are driven
by probability weighting, the predicted frequency of Allais Paradoxes is the same, as sub-
jects evaluate each lottery in isolation and focus exclusively its marginal payoff distribution.
However, if choices are driven by choice set dependence, the predicted frequency of Allais
Paradoxes is different when payoffs are independent than when they are perfectly correlated
due to the change in the joint payoff distribution.5 As in Bordalo et al. (2012b), this design
allows us to reliably discriminate between probability weighting and choice set dependence.
Moreover, since EUT can never account for Allais Paradoxes, the design also enables us to
control for EUT preferences.
To ensure that our results do not rely on a specific visual presentation of the binary
choices, the experiment uses two presentation formats. Half of the subjects confront the
“canonical presentation” while the other half confront the “states of the world presenta-
tion”. In the canonical presentation, the two lotteries in a binary choice are represented
5As explained in detail in Section 3, when choice set dependence is the sole driver of risky choices,
the predicted frequency of Allais Paradoxes is positive with independent payoffs and zero with perfectly
correlated payoffs.
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separately with distinct payoff distributions when payoffs are independent, and by their
joint payoff distribution when payoffs are perfectly correlated. In contrast, in the states of
the world presentation, the two lotteries are always represented by their joint payoff dis-
tribution, regardless whether payoffs are independent or perfectly correlated.6 Ideally, our
results should not depend on the presentation format.
To estimate the structural model and classify subjects into types, the lotteries’ payoffs and
probabilities vary systematically across the binary choices. Estimating the structural model
and taking heterogeneity into account in a parsimonious way is important for two reasons.
First, in order to make predictions about the subjects’ choices in other risky situations one
needs to know the decision theories and the corresponding parameters that mainly drive
the subjects’ behavior. Second, previous research uncovered substantial heterogeneity in
risk attitudes (Hey and Orme, 1994; Harless and Camerer, 1994; Starmer, 2000), with a
majority of non-EUT-types and a minority of EUT-types (Bruhin et al., 2010; Conte et al.,
2011). This heterogeneity must be taken into account when testing the relative importance
of different decision theories and making behavioral predictions – in particular in strategic
settings where even small minorities can determine the aggregate outcome (Haltiwanger and
Waldman, 1985, 1989; Fehr and Tyran, 2005).
Our structural model accounts for individual heterogeneity in a parsimonious way by
using a finite mixture approach. That is, instead of estimating individual-specific parame-
ters – which are typically noisy, hard to summarize in a concise way, and may suffer from
small sample bias – the structural model assumes the population to be made up by three
distinct types: EUT-types who are rational, CPT-types whose behavior is mostly driven by
probability weighting, and ST-types whose behavior is predominantly driven by choice set
dependence. Upon estimating the three types’ relative sizes and their average type-specific
parameters, we can classify every subject into the type that best fits her choices. This yields a
parsimonious account of the relative importance of rational behavior, probability weighting,
and choice set dependence. Furthermore, it also allows us to make type-specific predictions
about the subjects’ behavior in other domains of choice under risk.
For such behavioral predictions across domains to be meaningful, the subjects’ classifica-
tion of subjects into types and the estimated parameters need to reflect subjects’ behavior
– at least qualitatively – not only in-sample but also out-of-sample. To address this point,
6For screenshots illustrating the two presentation formats, see Figures 1 and 2 in Section 4.
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the experiment exposes subjects to additional lotteries that may trigger preference reversals.
Subjects always first choose between two of these additional lotteries and, later, evaluate
each of them in isolation. Analyzing the frequency of preference reversals in these additional
lotteries allows us to assess the validity of our classification of subjects into types in choices
that were not used for estimating the structural model.
The experimental evidence gives rise to three main results. The first result summarizes
the non-parametric evidence at the aggregate level; the second the insights gained from the
structural model and the classification of subjects into types; and the third the out-of-sample
predictions.
A non-parametric analysis of the aggregate choices provides the first main result. In the
aggregate, EUT is clearly rejected, and both choice set dependence and probability weighting
play a role. On the one hand, probability weighting plays a role, because the frequency of
Allais Paradoxes exceeds the noise-level regardless whether the lotteries’ payoffs are inde-
pendent or perfectly correlated.7 However, on the other hand, choice set dependence plays a
role too, as Allais Paradoxes occur more frequently when lotteries’ payoffs are independent
than when they are perfectly correlated. This result holds under both presentation formats.
The structural model yields the second main result. There is vast heterogeneity in the
subjects’ choices and the population can be segregated into 38% CPT-types, 34% ST-types,
and 28% EUT-types. However, while this classification indicates the best fitting decision
theory for each type, an inspection of the subjects’ average behavior per type reveals that
both choice set dependence and probability weighting play some role across all types, al-
though to a varying extent. Hence, the choices of all subjects seem to be driven by both
probability weighting and choice set dependence to some degree, but their relative strength
varies greatly across types.
The out-of-sample predictions about the preference reversals in the additional choices
confirm the above finding and provide the third main result. Subjects classified as ST-types
exhibit more preference reversals than those classified as EUT- and CPT-types. However,
since the frequency of preference reversals exceeds the noise-level across all types, choice
set dependence influences the choices of all three types. In conclusion, the classification of
subjects into types passes this stringent out-of-sample test and remains qualitatively valid
7To determine the noise-level, we look at Allais Paradoxes going in the inverse direction, i.e. the direction
that cannot be described by any non-EUT decision theory and, thus, is due to decision noise. See Figure 3
in Section 5 for details.
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in choices that were not used for estimating the structural model.
Section 2 describes how these results contribute to the existing literature. Section 3
explains the strategy for discriminating between the different decision theories. Section 4
introduces the experimental design. Section 5 presents the non-parametric results at the
aggregate level, while Section 6 discusses the structural model, its results, and the out-of-
sample predictions. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This section summarizes the related literature and highlights the paper’s main contributions.
The paper directly contributes to the empirical literature that aims at identifying the extent
to which probability weighting and choice set dependence drive risky choices. On the one
hand, there is considerable evidence suggesting that risk preferences depend on outcome
probabilities irrespective of the choice set (for examples, see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Camerer and Ho, 1994; Loomes and Segal, 1994; Starmer, 2000; Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2012).
On the other hand, the literature also has recognized that risky choices of many subjects
depend on the choice set and that subjects sometimes revert their preferences (Lichtenstein
and Slovic, 1971; Lindman, 1971; Grether and Plott, 1979; Pommerehne et al., 1982; Reilly,
1982; Cox and Epstein, 1989; Loomes et al., 1991). More recently, empirical tests of ST
confirmed the role of choice set dependence in non-incentivized Mturk experiments (Bordalo
et al., 2012b) and in two decisions each involving a choice between a lottery and a sure
amount (Booth and Nolen, 2012).
Thus, the existing literature suggests that choice set dependence and probability weight-
ing both influence risky choices. However, they have not been tested jointly in an incentivized
experiment. Furthermore, it is unclear what is their relative importance, and whether choice
set dependence and probability weighting each influence the behavior of all subjects to a
varying extent or of just certain types of subjects. The present paper provides an answer to
these questions by introducing an experiment that allows us not only to reliably discriminate
between choice set dependence and probability weighting – both non-parametrically and with
a structural model – but also to account for individual heterogeneity in a parsimonious way.
Moreover, the structural model adds to the literature that uses finite mixture models
to classify subjects into types. This literature has mostly been focusing on discriminating
rational from irrational behavior in decision making under risk (Bruhin et al., 2010; Fehr-
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Duda et al., 2010; Conte et al., 2011)8 and other complex decision situations (for examples
see El-Gamal and Grether, 1995; Houser et al., 2004; Houser and Winter, 2004; Stahl and
Wilson, 1995; Fischbacher et al., 2013). Our second main result enhances this strand of
literature by showing that there is also substantial heterogeneity within the group of non-
EUT subjects.
Uncovering this heterogeneity across non-EUT subjects not only contributes directly to
our understanding of decision making under risk but also could prove to be fruitful in other
domains as well. For instance, in deterministic consumer choice, there exist competing expla-
nations for the famous endowment effect – i.e. the behavioral phenomenon that consumers
tend to value goods higher as soon as they possess them (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988;
Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1990; Isoni et al., 2011). One explanation of the endowment
effect assumes loss aversion and an endogenous reference point, which shifts as soon as a
subject obtains a good and expects to keep it (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006). Another, compet-
ing explanation, is based on choice set dependence and has the following intuition: when the
subject receives an endowment, she compares it to the status quo of having nothing which
renders the good’s best attribute salient and inflates its valuation (Bordalo et al., 2012a).
Since our experimental design and structural model can isolate the group of subjects whose
choices are mostly influenced by choice set dependence, they may offer an empirical way to
study the relative importance of these competing explanations of the endowment effect.
Similarly, the experimental design and the structural model could also be used to study
the links between limited attention and economic decisions. For instance, Ko˝szegi and Szeidl
(2013) present a model in which limited attention and the focus on salient states affect
intertemporal choice. Another model by Gabaix (2015) studies the role of limited attention
on consumer demand and competitive equilibrium. Our methodology could provide a way
to test the implications of these models, as it allows to discriminate subjects with limited
attention from other behavioral and rational types.
3 Discriminating between Decision Theories
This section describes our strategy for discriminating between EUT, probability weighting –
represented by CPT –, and choice set dependence – represented by ST. The strategy (i) relies
8Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009) also apply finite mixture models in order to distinguish EUT from non-
EUT behavior. However, they classify decisions instead of subjects.
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on a series of binary choices between lotteries that may trigger the Allais Paradox and (ii)
manipulates the choice set by making the lotteries’ payoffs either independent or perfectly
correlated.
We explain the strategy with the following binary choice, taken from Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), between lotteries X and Y which may trigger the Common Consequence
Allais Paradox.9
X =

2500 p1 = 0.33
z p2 = 0.66
0 p3 = 0.01
vs. Y =
 2400 p1 + p3 = 0.34z p2 = 0.66
Note that the two lotteries have a common consequence, i.e. a common payoff z which
occurs with probability p2 in both lotteries. In this example, the Common Consequence
Allais Paradox refers to the robust empirical finding that if z = 2400, most subjects prefer
Y over X, whereas if z = 0, most subjects prefer X over Y .
Next, we show that EUT can never describe the Allais Paradox, CPT can always describe
it, and ST can only describe the Allais Paradox when the payoffs of the two lotteries are
independent but not when they are perfectly correlated.
3.1 EUT
According to EUT, the decision maker evaluates any lottery L with non-negative payoffs
x = (x1, . . . , xJ) and associated probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pJ) as
V EUT (L) =
J∑
j=1
pj v(xj) ,
where v is an increasing utility function over monetary payoffs with v(0) = 0.10 Note that
the value V EUT (L) only depends on the attributes of lottery L and not on the attributes of
the other lotteries in the choice set.
EUT cannot explain the Common Consequence Allais Paradox. In the above example,
the decision maker evaluates lottery X as V EUT (X) = p1 v(2500) + p2 v(z) + p3 v(0) and
lottery Y as V EUT (Y ) = (p1 + p3) v(2400) + p2 v(z) . When comparing the values of the
two lotteries, V EUT (X) and V EUT (Y ), the term involving the common consequence, p2 v(z),
9The analogous example for the Common Ratio Allais Paradox can be found in Appendix B.
10This assumes that subjects are interested in lottery payoffs and not final wealth states.
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cancels out. Hence, the decision maker’s choice between X and Y does not depend on the
value of the common consequence.
3.2 CPT
According to CPT, the decision maker ranks the non-negative monetary payoffs of any lottery
L such that x1 ≥ . . . ≥ xJ and evaluates the lottery as
V CPT (L) =
J∑
j=1
piCPTj (p) v(xj) ,
where pij is the decision weight attached to the value of payoff xj. As in EUT, the value
V CPT (L) only depends on the attributes of lottery L, i.e. the decision maker evaluates the
lottery in isolation. The decision weights are given by
piCPTj (p) =
 w(p1) for j = 1w (∑jk=1 pk)− w (∑j−1k=1 pk) for 2 ≤ j ≤ J ,
where pk is payoff xk’s probability and w is the probability weighting function. The proba-
bility weighting function exhibits three properties (Prelec, 1998; Wakker, 2010; Fehr-Duda
and Epper, 2012):
1. Strictly increasing in probabilities with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. This property ensures
that decision weights are non-negative and, together with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1,
implies that decision weights sum to one.
2. Inverse S-shape. The probability weighting function is concave for small probabilities
and convex for large probabilities. This ensures that the decision maker overweights
small probabilities and underweights large probabilities. This is necessary for CPT to
be able to explain the Common Consequence Allais Paradox, as shown further below.
3. Subproportionality. For the probabilities 1 ≥ q > p > 0 and the scaling factor 0 < λ < 1
the inequality w(q)
w(p)
> w(λq)
w(λp)
holds. Subproportionality is needed for CPT to be able to
explain the Common Ratio Allais Paradox, as shown in Appendix B.
We now explain how CPT can describe the Common Consequence Allais Paradox in the
choice between lotteries X and Y . When z = 2400, the choice is
X =

2500 p1 = 0.33
2400 p2 = 0.66
0 p3 = 0.01
vs. Y = 2400 .
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The decision maker prefers lottery Y over X if
V CPT (Y ) > V CPT (X)
v(2400) > piCPT1 v(2500) + pi
CPT
2 v(2400) + pi
CPT
3 v(0)
v(2400) > w(0.33)v(2500) + [w(0.99)− w(0.33)] v(2400)
+ [1− w(0.99)] v(0) .
Intuitively, due to the decision maker’s tendency to overestimate small probabilities and
underestimate large probabilities, the decision weight 1 − w(0.99) attached to the lowest
payoff of X is larger than its objective probability p3 = 0.01, which renders X unattractive.
Hence, when the common consequence is z = 2400, the decision maker has a tendency to
prefer Y over X. In contrast, when z = 0, the choice is
X =
 2500 p1 = 0.330 p2 + p3 = 0.67 vs. Y =
 2400 p1 + p3 = 0.340 p2 = 0.66 .
Now, the decision maker prefers lottery X over Y if
V CPT (X) > V CPT (Y )
w(0.33)v(2500) + [1− w(0.33)] v(0) > w(0.34)v(2400) + [1− w(0.34)] v(0) .
Intuitively, the decision maker prefers lottery X over Y because the decision weights
w(0.33) and w(0.34) are very close and, therefore, the decision is driven by the difference
in utilities between v(2500) and v(2400) rather than the difference in probabilities. Hence,
when the common consequence is z = 0, the decision maker no longer has a tendency to
prefer Y over X.
3.3 ST
According to ST, due to cognitive limitations the decision maker is a local thinker who
focuses her attention on some but not all states of the world. Salience shifts the focus of
attention to states of the world in which one payoff stands out relative to the payoffs of the
alternative. The decision maker overweights these salient states relative to the others. As
the salience of a state directly depends on the payoffs of the alternative, a lottery’s value is
choice set dependent and – in contrast to EUT and CPT – lotteries are no longer evaluated
in isolation.
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Formally, if the decision maker has to choose between two lotteries L1 and L2, she ranks
each possible state s ∈ {1, . . . , S} according to its salience σ(x1s, x2s), where x1s and x2s are
the payoffs of L1 and L2, respectively, in state s. The salience function σ satisfies three
properties:
1. Ordering. For two states s and s˜ we have that if [xmins , x
max
s ] is a subset of [x
min
s˜ , x
max
s˜ ],
then σ(x1s˜, x
2
s˜) > σ(x
1
s, x
2
s). Ordering implies that states with bigger differences in
payoffs tend to be more salient.
2. Diminishing Sensitivity. For any  > 0, then σ(x1s, x
2
s) > σ(x
1
s + , x
2
s + ). Diminishing
sensitivity implies that for states with a given difference in payoffs, salience diminishes
the further away from zero the difference in payoffs is.
3. Symmetry: σ(x1s, x
2
s) = σ(x
2
s, x
1
s). Symmetry implies that for a given difference in
payoffs, the salience of the state is the same regardless which of the two lotteries
provides the higher or the lower payoff.
The decision weight of each state s depends on the state’s salience-rank, rs ∈ {1, . . . , S}
with lower values being associated with higher salience:
piSTs (x
1, x2) = ps
δrs∑
m∈S δ
rm pm
, (1)
where ps is the probability that state s is realized, and δ ≤ 1 is the decision maker’s degree
of local thinking. Note that for δ = 1 the decision maker is rational and weights states by
their objective probabilities, whereas for δ < 1 the decision maker is a local thinker and
overweights salient states. This yields the following values for lotteries L1 and L2:
V ST (L1|{L1, L2}) =
S∑
s=1
piSTs (x
1, x2) v(x1s)
and
V ST (L2|{L1, L2}) =
S∑
s=1
piSTs (x
1, x2) v(x2s) .
Note that the value of each lottery depends on all lotteries in the choice set {L1, L2}.
We now explain how ST can describe the Common Consequence Allais Paradox in
the choice between lotteries X and Y when their payoffs are independent of each other.
When z = 2400, there are three states of the world which rank in salience as follows:
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σ(0, 2400) > σ(2500, 2400) > σ(2400, 2400). The decision maker prefers lottery Y over X if
V ST (Y |{X, Y }) > V ST (X|{X, Y }), where
V ST (Y |{X, Y }) = v(2400) ,
and
V ST (X|{X, Y }) = piST2 (2500, 2400) v(2500) + piST3 (2400, 2400) v(2400)
+piST1 (0, 2400) v(0) .
Using v(0) = 0 and the decision weights given by equation (1), the condition for preferring
Y over X becomes
δ <
0.01
0.33
v(2400)
v(2500)− v(2400) . (2)
Intuitively, lottery X provides the lowest payoff in the most salient state which makes
lottery Y relatively attractive despite having a lower expected payoff. Hence, when the
common consequence is z = 2400 and the degree of local thinking is severe enough, the
decision maker prefers Y over X.
In contrast, when z = 0, there are four states of the world which rank in salience as
follows: σ(2500, 0) > σ(0, 2400) > σ(2500, 2400) > σ(0, 0). The decision maker prefers
lottery X over Y if V ST (X|{X, Y }) > V ST (Y |{X, Y }), where
V ST (X|{X, Y }) = [piST1 (2500, 0) + piST3 (2500, 2400)] v(2500)
+
[
piST2 (0, 2400) + pi
ST
4 (0, 0)
]
v(0) ,
and
V ST (Y |{X, Y }) = [piST2 (0, 2400) + piST3 (2500, 2400)] v(2400)
+
[
piST1 (2500, 0) + pi
ST
4 (0, 0)
]
v(0) .
Using v(0) = 0 and the decision weights given by equation (1), the decision maker prefers
X over Y when
(0.33) (0.66) v(2500)− δ (0.67) (0.34) v(2400)
+δ2 (0.33) (0.34) [v(2500)− v(2400)] > 0 . (3)
Now, lottery X provides the highest payoff in the most salient state. Hence, when the
common consequence is z = 0 and the degree of local thinking is severe enough, the decision
maker prefers X over Y .
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We now turn to the case in which the two lotteries’ payoffs are perfectly correlated. In
that case, ST can no longer describe the Common Consequence Allais Paradox. When the
two lotteries’ payoffs are perfectly correlated there are just the following three states of the
world:
ps 0.33 0.66 0.01
xs 2500 z 0
ys 2400 z 2400
The ranking in terms of salience of these three states, σ(0, 2400) > σ(2500, 2400) >
σ(z, z), is independent of the common consequence z. Hence, regardless of the common
consequence, the decision maker has a tendency to prefer Y over X, and the Common
Consequence Allais Paradox can no longer be described by ST when the lotteries’ payoffs
are perfectly correlated.
3.4 Summary
Table 1 summarizes the strategy for discriminating between EUT, probability weighting, and
choice set dependence.
Table 1: When can the Allais Paradox occur?
Lottery Payoffs
independent correlated
Rationality: EUT 7 7
Probability Weighting: CPT 3 3
Choice Set Dependence: ST 3 7
EUT can never explain the Allais Paradox because the independence axiom implies that
the preference functional is linear in probabilities and each lottery is evaluated independently
of the other lotteries in the choice set. In contrast, probability weighting – represented by
CPT – can explain the Allais paradox. This is because the decision weight of each payoff
depends non-linearly on the marginal payoff distribution of the lottery under consideration
which remains unchanged regardless whether the lotteries’ payoffs are independent or per-
fectly correlated. Finally, choice set dependence – represented by ST – can explain the Allais
paradox only when the lotteries’ payoffs are independent but not when they are perfectly
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correlated. This is because decision weights depend on the joint payoff distribution of all
lotteries in the choice set, which changes when we manipulate the correlation structure of
the lotteries’ payoffs.
4 Experimental Design
This section presents the experimental design which consists of two parts. In the main part,
subjects make a series of binary choices between lotteries that may trigger the Common
Consequence and the Common Ratio Allais Paradoxes. Based on these choices, we discrim-
inate between rational behavior, probability weighting, as well as choice set dependence,
and classify subjects into EUT-, CPT-, and ST-types, respectively. In the additional part,
subjects make choices that could lead to preference reversals which allow us to validate the
classification of subjects into types using out-of-sample-predictions.
4.1 Main Part
We now present the main part of the experiment. First, we explain how we constructed the
series of binary choices. Subsequently, we describe the formats which we use to present the
binary choices to the subjects.
4.1.1 Choices between Lotteries
Every subject goes through two blocks of binary choices between lotteries that may trigger
the Allais Paradoxes. Both blocks feature the same binary choices, except that in one block
the lotteries’ payoffs are independent while in the other they are perfectly correlated. As
described in the previous section, this allows us to discriminate non-parametrically between
rational behavior, probability weighting, and choice set dependence by comparing within-
subjects the frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the two blocks.
The binary choices within each block feature lotteries that vary systematically in payoffs
and probabilities. This systematic variation not only allows us to estimate the parameters of
a structural model for each decision theory but also ensures that our results are not driven
by a particular set of lotteries.
The binary choices that may trigger the Common Consequence Allais Paradox are based
on a 3× 3× 3 design. The design uses the following three different payoff levels:
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Payoff Level 1: X =

2500 p1
z p2
0 p3
vs. Y =
 2400 p1 + p3z p2
Payoff Level 2: X =

5000 p1
z p2
0 p3
vs. Y =
 4800 p1 + p3z p2
Payoff Level 2: X =

3000 p1
z p2
500 p3
vs. Y =
 2600 p1 + p3z p2
Varying the payoffs across these three levels while keeping probabilities constant iden-
tifies the curvature of the utility function, v. Similarly, the design features three different
probability distributions, p = (p1, p2, p3), over the lotteries’ payoffs:
Probability Distribution 1: p = (0.33, 0.66, 0.01)
Probability Distribution 2: p = (0.30, 0.65, 0.05)
Probability Distribution 3: p = (0.25, 0.60, 0.15)
Varying the probability distributions while keeping the lotteries’ payoffs constant identifies
the shape of probability weighting function, w, in CPT and the degree of local thinking, δ,
in ST. Finally, the design uses three different levels of the common consequence, z, to trigger
the Common Consequence Allais Paradox:
1. z = x3, i.e. the common consequence is equal to the lowest payoff of lottery X. In this
case, lottery X and Y offer two payoffs each.
2. z = y1, i.e. the common consequence is equal to the first payoff of lottery Y . In this
case, lottery X offers three payoffs and lottery Y is a sure amount.
3. z is different from any other payoffs of the two lotteries but slightly below the first
payoff of lottery Y .11 In this case, lottery X offers three payoffs and lottery Y offers
two payoffs.
The first two levels of the common consequence trigger the classical version of the Common
Consequence Allais Paradox, as described in the previous section. We also include the third
11For Payoff Level 1: z = 2000; for Payoff Level 2: z = 4000; for Payoff Level 3: z = 2000.
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level of the common consequence, since in combination with the fist level, it may trigger a
more general version of the Common Consequence Allais Paradox in which the lottery Y
does not degenerate into a sure amount.
The binary choices that may trigger the Common Ratio Allais Paradox are based on a
similar 3 × 3 × 2 design. The design uses different payoff and probability levels which are
scaled up and down, respectively, to provoke the Common Ratio Allais Paradox. For details,
please refer to Appendix C.
To avoid order effects, we randomize the order of the binary choices within each of the
two blocks and counterbalance the order of the two blocks across subjects.
4.1.2 Presentation Format
We present the binary choices between lotteries in two formats: the “canonical presentation”
and the “states of the world presentation”. We apply a between-subjects-design, i.e. half of
the subjects are exposed to the canonical presentation and the other half to the states of the
world presentation.
The two presentation formats differ in the way they show the binary choices between
lotteries with independent payoffs to the subjects. In the canonical presentation, as shown
by the screenshot in Figure 1, the two lotteries X and Y are presented side by side as separate
lotteries with independent payoff distributions. In the states of the world presentation, as
shown by the screenshot in Figure 2, the lotteries are presented in a table displaying their
joint payoff distribution. For binary choices between lotteries with correlated payoffs the two
presentation formats are identical and display the two lotteries’ joint payoff distribution.
The two presentation formats have distinct advantages and disadvantages. The main ad-
vantages of the canonical presentation are that it emphasizes the difference between lotteries
with independent vs. correlated payoffs and that subjects are probably more used to the
canonical presentation of lotteries with independent payoffs. However, the main disadvan-
tage of the canonical presentation is that between the two blocks not only the correlation
structure of the lotteries’ payoffs changes but also their visual presentation. In contrast,
the states of the world presentation keeps the visual presentation constant across the two
blocks, but presents lotteries with independent payoffs in an unfamiliar way. Ideally, the two
presentation formats should have no effect on the results.
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Figure 1: Canonical Presentation of the Binary Choice between Two Lotteries with Inde-
pendent Payoffs
4.2 Additional Part
To validate the classification of subjects into types, we use out-of-sample predictions about
the frequency of preference reversals. To establish whether a subject has a tendency to revert
her preference, the main part of the experiment contains six binary choices between lotteries
that are neither used for estimating the subject’s preferences nor for classifying them into
types. In the additional part of the experiment, the subject has to evaluate each of these
additional lotteries in isolation by stating their certainty equivalent.
Each of the additional lotteries is presented in a choice menu in which the subject has
to indicate whether she prefers the lottery or a certain payoff. The certain payoff increases
from the lottery’s lowest payoff, 0, to its highest payoff in 21 equal increments. The point
where the subject switches form preferring the certain payoff to preferring the lottery allows
us to approximate the certainty equivalent.12
12This method to trigger preference reversals does not use the Becker, De Groot, and Marschak mechanism
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Figure 2: States of the World Presentation of the Binary Choice between Two Lotteries with
Independent Payoffs
The order in which we elicit the certainty equivalents of the additional lotteries is random-
ized across subjects. Moreover, since the six binary choices between the additional lotteries
appeared in the main part of the experiment, subjects should not recall the additional lotter-
ies when stating their certainty equivalents. The six binary choices between the additional
lotteries can be found in Appendix D.
By comparing the binary choices between the additional lotteries and their certainty
equivalents, we can detect the number of preference reversals of every subject. Since there
are six binary choices each subject can exhibit between 0 and 6 preference reversals.
(BDM; Becker et al., 1964) to elicit certainty equivalents and, therefore, avoids the problems pointed out by
Karni and Safra (1987) and Segal (1988). Consequently, the preference reversals we observe in this part of
the experiment represent violations of EUT’s transitivity axiom. We did not impose a unique switch-point.
34 of 283 subjects (12.0%) switched more than once and, thus, did not reveal a unique certainty equivalent
for at least one lottery. We excluded these subjects form the out-of-sample analysis of preference reversals
in Section 6.3.
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4.3 Number of Choices
Table 2 summarizes the number of choices in the two presentation formats. Subjects in
the canonical presentation go through a total of 93 binary choices, while subjects in the
states of the world presentation go through only 84 binary choices. The number of binary
choices differs between the presentation formats since the 9 binary choices designed for
triggering the Common Consequence Allais Paradox in which lottery X has three payoffs
and lottery Y is a sure amount look identical regardless whether the lotteries’ payoffs are
independent or correlated. Moreover, we use 3 of the 3×3×2 = 18 binary choices designed to
trigger the Common Ratio Allais Paradox to make out-of-sample predictions about preference
reversals. We leave these three binary choices out in the calculation of the frequencies of
Allais Paradoxes and the structural estimations (see Appendices C and D). Therefore, the
table shows these 3 binary choices among the total of 6 choices used for triggering preference
reversals.
Regardless of the presentation format, each subject also evaluates 9 lotteries in isolation
during the additional part of the experiment. This yields the certainty equivalents that we
need to detect preference reversals and test our out-of-sample predictions.
4.4 Implementation in the Lab and Incentives
We conducted the experiment in the computer lab at the University of Lausanne between
February and May 2015 using a web application based on PHP and MySQL. Most subjects
were students of the University of Lausanne and the Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lau-
sanne, recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment consisted of 14 sessions with
283 students in total.13
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects received some general instructions informing
them about the structure of the experiment, their anonymity, the show up fee, and the
conversion rate of points into Swiss Francs.14 At the beginning of each part, subjects received
additional printed instructions. These additional instructions comprised the description of
the choices made in that part, the description of the payment procedure for that part, and
several comprehension questions which were controlled by the assistants before subjects could
13We also carried out 3 pilot sessions.
14Payoffs were shown in points. 100 points corresponded to one Swiss Franc. At the time of the experiment,
1 Swiss Franc corresponded to roughly 1.04 USD.
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Table 2: Number of Binary Choices by Presentation Format and Type of Allais Paradox
Canonical
Independent Correlated Preference
Allais Paradox Payoffs Payoffs Reversal
Common Consequence 27 27
Common Ratioa 15 18
Total Binary Choices 42 45 6
States of the World
Independent Correlated Preference
Allais Paradox Payoffs Payoffs Reversal
Common Consequence 18b 27
Common Ratioa 15 18
Total 33 45 6
a Three of the 3×3×2 = 18 binary choices to trigger the Common Ratio Allais Paradox
were used to make out-of-sample predictions about preference reversals. These three
binary choices were left out in the calculation of the frequencies of Allais Paradoxes
and the structural estimations (see Appendices C and D).
b In the states of the world presentation, the nine binary choices where lottery X
has three possible payoffs and lottery Y is a sure amount look identical regardless
whether the lotteries’ payoffs are independent or correlated. Since we did not want
to present the same choices twice, subjects exposed to in the states of the world
presentation had to go through nine binary choices less than those exposed to the
canonical presentation.
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begin. The additional instructions differed depending on whether a subject was exposed to
the canonical presentation or the states of the world presentation. All instructions were
written in French. English translations are available in the Online Appendix.
To incentivize subjects’ choices in both parts of the experiment, we applied the prior
incentive system (Johnson et al., 2014). This avoids violations of isolation, which may
otherwise arise with a random lottery selection procedure, as pointed out by Holt (1986).
In each part, every subject had to draw a sealed envelope from an urn before making any
choices. The envelope contained one of the choices the subject was going to make in that
part and which later was used for payment. At the very end of the experiment, the subject
went to another room where she opened the envelopes together with an assistant, rolled some
dice to determine the payoff of the chosen lotteries, and received her payment.
After making their choices, but before determining and receiving their payments, subjects
filled in a demographic questionnaire, completed a short version of the Big 5 personality
questionnaire, and a cognitive ability test with 12 questions based on Raven’s matrices. The
instructions were shown on screen at the beginning of each task. The cognitive ability test
was also incentivized and subjects received 50 points per correct answer.15
Each subject was paid a show-up fee of 10 Swiss Francs. Total earnings varied between
12.00 and 142.50 Swiss Francs with a mean of 57.66 and a standard deviation of 26.39 Swiss
Francs. Each session lasted for approximately 90 minutes.
5 Non-Parametric Results
In this section, we present the non-parametric results by analyzing the relative frequency of
Allais Paradoxes. Figure 3 shows the average frequency of Allais Paradoxes relative to their
maximum possible number between lotteries with independent and correlated payoffs.
First, we compare the relative frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the expected direction
according to both probability weighting and choice set dependence (Panel (a)) to those in the
inverse direction (Panel (b)). This comparison reveals that Allais Paradoxes in the expected
direction are substantially and significantly more frequent than those in the inverse direction
(t-tests: p-values < 0.001 in all pairwise comparisons). For example, for both presentation
formats together, the average frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the expected direction is 28.2%
15We do not find any statistically significant relationship between these individual characteristics and the
classification of subjects into types. Results are available on request.
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when lottery payoffs are independent and 18.0% when lottery payoffs are perfectly correlated.
The corresponding frequencies of Allais Paradoxes in the inverse direction are only 7.8% and
6.8%, respectively. We interpret the Allais Paradoxes in the inverse direction as the result
of decision noise. Since the relative frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the expected direction
is significantly higher than in the inverse direction – regardless whether lottery payoffs are
independent or perfectly correlated – we conclude that aggregate choices cannot be described
by EUT plus decision noise.
Next, we focus on Allais Paradoxes in the expected direction and compare their fre-
quencies when lottery payoffs are independent vs. perfectly correlated. Regardless of the
presentation format, we find that Allais Paradoxes in the expected direction are always
significantly more frequent when lottery payoffs are independent than when they are per-
fectly correlated (t-tests: p-values < 0.001 for both presentation formats separately as well
as pooled).16 This finding indicates that choice set dependence plays a role for describing
aggregate choices. However, the frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the expected direction
is significantly above the level explained by decision noise – even when lottery payoffs are
perfectly correlated (t-tests: p-values < 0.001 for both presentation formats separately as
well as pooled). This cannot be described exclusively by choice set dependence plus noise.
Under choice set dependence plus noise, the frequency of Allais Paradoxes with perfectly
correlated lottery payoffs in the expected direction should be driven exclusively by noise
and, thus, match the corresponding frequency in the inverse direction. Since this is not the
case (t-tests: p-values < 0.001 for both presentation formats separately as well as pooled),
we conclude that probability weighting also plays a role in driving aggregate choices.
Figure 4 takes a more disaggregate look at the data and shows the distributions of the
relative frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the expected direction separately for independent
and perfectly correlated lottery payoffs. The shift between the two distributions confirms
that subjects exhibit a higher frequency of Allais Paradoxes when lottery payoffs are in-
dependent than when they are perfectly correlated, implying that choice set dependence
matters. However, in both cases the majority of subjects exhibits a substantial number
of Allais Paradoxes, implying that probability weighting matters too. Taken together, this
non-parametric evidence yields our first main result.
16When doing the same comparisons of the relative frequencies of Allais Paradoxes in the inverse direction,
we find no systematic difference between independent and perfectly correlated payoffs. This reinforces our
interpretation that the Allais Paradoxes in the inverse direction are the result of decision noise.
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Figure 3: Relative Frequency of Allais Paradoxes
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The figure shows the average frequency of Allais Paradoxes relative to their maximum possible number
between lotteries with independent and perfectly correlated payoffs. Panel (a) depicts the relative frequency
of Allais Paradoxes that go in the expected direction. Panel (b) shows the relative frequency of Allais
Paradoxes that go in the inverse direction and probably reflect noise in the subjects’ choices. The two bars
on the left pool the choices from subjects exposed to the canonical presentation with those from subjects
exposed to the states of the world presentation. The two bars in the middle and on the right separate the
choices by presentation format.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the Relative Frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the Expected Direc-
tion
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The histograms show the distribution of the relative frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the expected direction
for independent and perfectly correlated lottery payoffs. Choices from both presentation formats are pooled
together.
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Result 1 For aggregate choices, EUT is clearly rejected and both choice set dependence as
well as probability weighting play a role.
In addition, when looking at the impact of the presentation format, we find a statistically
significant but qualitatively unimportant effect. The frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the
expected direction is significantly higher in the canonical presentation than in the states of
the world presentation when lottery payoffs are independent (t-test: p-value = 0.005) and
significantly lower when lottery payoffs are perfectly correlated (t-test: p-value = 0.006).
However, even in the states of the world presentation the frequency of Allais Paradoxes
remains significantly higher when lottery payoffs are independent than when they are cor-
related (t-test: p-value < 0.001). Thus, Result 1 is valid under both presentation formats.
Consequently, from now on, we pool the choices from both presentation formats together.
6 Structural Model
In this section, we discuss the set up and the results of the structural model. It allows us to
take individual heterogeneity into account in a parsimonious way and classify the subjects
into distinct preference types. We also validate the classification of subjects into types using
out-of-sample predictions.
6.1 Set Up
The structural model is based on a finite mixture model (see McLachlan and Peel, 2000, for
an overview) and uses a random utility approach for discrete choices (McFadden, 1981). It
discriminates between subjects whose preferences are rational and best described by EUT,
subjects whose preferences display probability weighting and are best described by CPT,
and subjects whose preferences display choice set dependence and are best described by ST.
Controlling for the presence of rational subjects is important, as previous research revealed
a minority of EUT-types in various student subject pools (Bruhin et al., 2010; Conte et al.,
2011).
6.1.1 Random Utility Approach
Consider a subject i ∈ {1, . . . , N} whose preferences are best described by decision model M
in M = {EUT,CPT, ST}. She prefers lottery Xg over Yg in binary choice g ∈ {1, . . . , G}
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when the random utility of choosing Xg, V
M(Xg, θM)+ X , is higher than the random utility
of choosing Yg, V
M(Yg, θM)+Y . The random errors X and Y are realizations of an extreme
value 1 distribution with scale parameter 1/σM , and the vector θM comprises decision model
M ’s preference parameters. This implies that the probability of subject i choosing Xg, i.e.
Cig = X, is given by
P (Cig = X; θM , σM) = Pr[V
M(Xg, θM)− V M(Yg, θM) ≥ Y − X ]
=
exp[σM V
M(Xg, θM)]
exp[σM V M(Xg, θM)] + exp[σM V M(Yg, θM)]
.
Note that the parameter σM governs the choice sensitivity towards differences in deter-
ministic value of the lotteries. If σM is 0, the subject chooses each lottery with probability
50% regardless of the deterministic value it provides. If σM is arbitrarily large, the proba-
bility of choosing the lottery with the higher deterministic value approaches 1.
Subject i’s contribution to the density function of the random utility model corresponds
to the product of the choice probabilities over all G binary decisions, i.e.
fM(Ci; θM , σM) =
G∏
g=1
P (Cig = X; θM , σM)
I(Cig=X) P (Cig = Y ; θM , σM)
1−I(Cig=X) ,
where I(Cig = X) is 1 if subject i chooses lottery Xg and 0 otherwise.
6.1.2 Finite Mixture Model
Since risk preferences are heterogeneous, we do not directly observe which model best de-
scribes subject i’s preferences. In other words, we do not know ex-ante whether subject i is
an EUT-, CPT-, or ST-type. Hence, we have to weight i’s type-specific density contributions
by the corresponding ex-ante probabilities of type-membership, piM , in order to obtain her
contribution to the likelihood of the finite mixture model,
`(Ψ;Ci) = piEUT fEUT (Ci; θEUT , σEUT ) + piCPT fCPT (Ci; θCPT , σCPT )
+piST fST (Ci; θST , σST ) ,
where the vector Ψ = (θEUT , θCPT , θST , σEUT , σCPT , σST , piEUT , piCPT ) comprises all param-
eters that need to be estimated, and piST = 1 − piEUT − piCPT .17 Note that the ex-ante
17Note that i’s likelihood contribution is highly non-linear. Maximizing the finite mixture model’s likeli-
hood is therefore not trivial and standard numerical maximization techniques, such as the BFGS algorithm,
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probabilities of type-membership are the same across all subjects and correspond to the
relative sizes of the types in the population.
Once we estimated the parameters of the finite mixture model, we can classify each
subject into the type she most likely belongs to, given her choices and the the estimated
parameters, Ψˆ. To do so, we apply Bayes’ rule and obtain subject i’s individual ex-post
probabilities of type-membership,
τiM =
pˆiM fM(Ci; θˆM , σˆM)∑
m∈M pˆim fm(Ci; θˆm, σˆm)
. (4)
Based on these individual ex-post probabilities of type-membership, we can also assess the
ambiguity in the classification of subjects into types. If the finite mixture model classifies
subjects cleanly into types, most τiM should be either very close to 0 or to 1. In contrast, if
the finite mixture model fails to come up with a clean classification of subjects into distinct
types, many τiM will be in the vicinity of 1/3.
6.1.3 Specification of Functional Forms
To keep the model parsimonious and yet flexible in fitting the data, we specify the following
functional forms. In all three decision models, we use a power specification for the utility
function v, i.e.
v(x) =
 x
1−β
1−β for β 6= 1
lnx for β = 1
,
which has a convenient interpretation, since β measures v’s concavity. Moreover, this speci-
fication turned out to be a neat compromise between parsimony and goodness of fit (Stott,
2006). In CPT, we follow the proposal by Prelec (1998) and specify the probability weighting
function as
w(p) = exp(−(− ln(p))α) ,
where 0 < α ≤ 1 measures the degree of likelihood sensitivity. When α = 1, w is linear in
probabilities. When α gets smaller, w becomes more inversely s-shaped. This specification
will usually fail to find its global maximum. We therefore apply the expectation maximization (EM) algo-
rithm to obtain the model’s maximum likelihood estimates Ψˆ (Dempster et al., 1977). The EM algorithm
proceeds iteratively in two steps: In the E-step, it computes the individual ex-post probabilities of type-
membership given the actual fit of the model (see equation (4)). In the subsequent M-step, it updates the fit
of the model by using the previously computed ex-post probabilities to maximize each types’ log likelihood
contribution separately.
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of the probability weighting function satisfies the three properties discussed in Section 3.2.18
In ST, the decision weights depend on the degree of local thinking 0 < δ ≤ 1 which we
directly estimate using equation (1).19
6.2 Results
We now present and interpret the result of the structural model. Table 3 exhibits the type-
specific parameter estimates of the finite mixture model. The results show that there is
substantial heterogeneity in subjects’ choices. The choices of 28.4% of subjects are best
described by EUT, the choices of 37.9% are best described by CPT, and the choices of
33.7% are best described by ST. When classifying subjects into types using their ex-post
probabilities of type-membership, we obtain a clean classification of subjects into 80 EUT-
types, 108 CPT-types, and 95 ST-types.20
This classification confirms 1 obtained non-parametrically at the aggregate level. The
choices of the majority of subjects is best described by either CPT or ST, while – consistent
with previous evidence on risky choices of student subjects (Bruhin et al., 2010; Conte et al.,
2011) – only a minority is best described by EUT.
On average, the 80 EUT-types display an almost linear utility function which makes
them essentially risk neutral. Although the estimated concavity of βˆ = 0.080 is statistically
significant, it is almost negligible in economic magnitude. Moreover, among the three types,
the EUT-types exhibit the highest level of decision noise which translates into a relatively
low estimated choice sensitivity.
The 108 CPT-types exhibit, on average, a concave utility function with βˆ = 0.572 and
a low degree of likelihood sensitivity with αˆ = 0.469. This confirms that the CPT-types’
choices are strongly influenced by probability weighting. With these parameter estimates,
18We also tested the two-parameter version of Prelec’s probability weighting function. However, as the
second parameter measuring the function’s net index of convexity is very close to 1, results remain virtually
unchanged (see Appendix A). Hence, we opt for the one-parameter version to keep the total number of
parameter the same for CPT and ST.
19In all of the binary choices we use for triggering the Allais Paradoxes, the salience ranking of the states
of the world is fully determined by ordering, diminishing sensitivity, and symmetry (see Section 3.3 and the
Online Appendix). Hence, we do not need to specify a particular salience function.
20Most of the ex-post probabilities of individual type-membership are either close to 0 or 1, confirming
that almost all subjects can be unambiguously classified into one of these three types. Appendix E shows
histograms with the ex-post probabilities of type-membership.
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Table 3: Type-Specific Parameter Estimates of the Finite Mixture Model
Type-specific estimates EUT CPT ST
Relative size (pi) 0.284∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(0.047)∗∗∗ (0.045)∗∗∗ (0.037)∗∗∗
Concavity of utility function (β) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗
(0.033)∗∗∗ (0.055)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗
Likelihood sensitivity (α) 0.469◦◦◦
(0.026)∗∗∗
Degree of local thinking (δ) 0.924◦◦◦
(0.013)∗∗∗
Choice sensitivity (σ) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 2.756∗∗∗
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.101)∗∗∗ (0.359)∗∗∗
Number of subjectsa 80∗∗∗ 108∗∗∗ 95∗∗∗
Number of observations 23,316
Log Likelihood -11,458.71
AIC 22,937.41
BIC 23,017.98
Subject cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significantly different
from 0 (1) at the 1% level: ∗∗∗ (◦◦◦).
a
Subjects are assigned to the best-fitting model according to their ex-post probabilities
of type-membership (see Equation (4)).
the average CPT-type displays the Common Consequence Allais Paradox discussed in the
motivating example in Section 3.
The 95 ST-types display, on average, a strongly concave utility function with βˆ = 0.870
and a weak but statistically significant degree of local thinking corresponding to δˆ = 0.924.
Note that although the average ST-type’s degree of local thinking appears to be low, she
still exhibits the Common Consequence Allais Paradox discussed in the motivating example
in Section 3. The reason is that with a strongly concave utility function, even a low degree
of local thinking is sufficient to generate the Common Consequence Allais Paradox.21
21This is mainly due to Inequality (2), as the difference v(2500)−v(2400) gets smaller. On the other hand,
Inequality (3) is less affected by the concavity of the utility function and can still be satisfied with a small
degree of local thinking.
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Figure 5: Relative Frequency of Allais Paradoxes by Type
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Independent Payoffs Correlated Payoffs
The figure shows the average frequency of Allais Paradoxes relative to their maximum possible number
between lotteries with independent and perfectly correlated payoffs, separately for EUT-, CPT-, and ST-
types. Panel (a) depicts the relative frequency of Allais Paradoxes that go in the expected direction. Panel
(b) shows the relative frequency of Allais Paradoxes that go in the inverse direction and probably reflect
noise in the subjects’ choices. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of subjects in each of the
three types.
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An interesting question that the finite mixture model’s parameter estimates cannot di-
rectly address is whether probability weighting and salience exclusively drive the choices of
the CPT- and ST-types, respectively, or whether they influence the choices of all types to
a varying degree. To answer this question, we turn to Figure 5 which shows the relative
frequency of Allais Paradoxes separately for EUT-, CPT-, and ST-types.
The relative frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the expected direction, shown in Panel (a),
reveals the following. First, across all types, Allais Paradoxes are more frequent when lottery
payoffs are independent than when they are perfectly correlated. This indicates that salience
drives the choices not only of the ST-types – for whom the difference is most pronounced
– but also of the CPT-types, and, to a smaller extent, even of the EUT-types. Second, all
types exhibit a high relative frequency of Allais Paradoxes when lottery payoffs are perfectly
correlated. This indicates that probability weighting drives the choices not only of the CPT-
types – who display the highest relative frequency of Allais Paradoxes when lottery payoffs
are correlated – but also of the ST- and EUT-types.
The relative frequency of Allais Paradoxes in the inverse direction, shown in Panel (b),
shows that EUT-types make much noisier choices than CPT- and ST-types. This is consis-
tent with the estimated choice sensitivity being much lower for the EUT-types. Moreover,
it indicates that roughly two thirds of the EUT-types’ Allais Paradoxes in the expected
direction may be due to noise instead of salience or probability weighting.
Taken together, the structural estimations and the resulting classification of subjects into
types yield our second main result.
Result 2 There is vast heterogeneity in the subjects’s choices and the population can be
segregated in a parsimonious way into 38% CPT-types, 34% ST-types, and 28% EUT-types.
However, while this classification indicates the best fitting model for each type, both choice
set dependence as well as probability weighting drive the choices of all types, although to a
varying extent.
6.3 Out-of-Sample Predictions
Next, we assess how well this parsimonious classification of subjects into types predicts the
frequency of preference reversals out-of-sample, i.e. in the choices subjects made in additional
part of the experiment described in Section 4.2.
We expect the ST-types to exhibit substantially more preference reversals than the EUT-
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Figure 6: Relative Frequency of Preference Reversals by Type
EUT (68) CPT (95) ST (86)
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The figure shows the average frequency of preference reversals by type relative to their maximum possible
number in the choices of the additional part of the experiment (see Section 4.2). Panel (a) depicts the relative
frequency of preference reversals that go in the expected direction. Panel (b) shows the relative frequency of
preference reversals that go in the inverse direction and probably reflect noise in the subjects’ choices. The
numbers in parentheses indicate the number of subjects in each of the three types. 34 of the 283 subjects
(12.0%) are excluded from the analysis because they exhibit more than one switch-point in at least one
of the choice menus used for eliciting the certainty equivalents. Exhibiting more than one switch-point is
independent of type-membership (χ2-test of independence: p-value = 0.534).
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and CPT-types, since their choices are mainly driven by choice set dependence. However,
since choice set dependence also plays some role across in the EUT- and CPT-types, we
expect to observe an above noise level of preference reversals in these two types as well.
Figure 6 shows the relative frequency of preference reversals by type and confirms this
prediction. Panel (a) displays the preference reversals in the expected direction – i.e. those
that can be explained with choice set dependence – while Panel (b) shows the preference
reversals in the inverse direction – i.e. those that cannot be explained with choice set
dependence and are most likely due to decision noise. The relative frequency of preference
reversals in the expected direction is significantly higher for the ST-types than for both the
EUT- and the CPT-types (t-tests: p-value = 0.083 for ST vs. EUT, and p-value < 0.001
for ST vs. CPT). The EUT- and CPT-types, on the other hand, exhibit a similar relative
frequency of preference reversals in the expected direction (t-tests: p-value = 0.135). In
addition, the relative frequency of preference reversals in the inverse direction is substantially
lower than in the expected direction across all types, confirming that choice set dependence
plays a role in the choices of all three types (t-tests: p-values < 0.001 across all types). In
sum, this yields our third main result.
Result 3 The out-of-sample predictions are qualitatively in line with Result 2, that is, sub-
jects classified as ST-types exhibit more preference reversals than those classified as EUT-
and CPT-types. However, since the frequency of preference reversals exceeds the noise level
across all types, choice set dependence plays a role in driving the behavior of all three types.
7 Conclusion
This paper discriminates between probability weighting and choice set dependence both non-
parametrically and with a structural model. There are several main conclusions. First, for
aggregate choices, both choice set dependence and probability weighting matter. Second,
however, there is substantial individual heterogeneity which can be parsimoniously char-
acterized by three types. 38% of subjects are CPT-types whose behavior is predominantly
driven by probability weighting, while 34% of subjects are ST-types whose behavior is mainly
driven by choice set dependence. The remaining 28% of subjects are EUT-types and their
behavior is mostly rational. Finally, this classification of subjects is valid out-of-sample, as
the subjects classified as ST-types exhibit significantly more preference reversals than their
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peers.
These conclusions are directly relevant for the literature that aims at identifying the main
behavioral drivers of risky choices. This literature has so far treated probability weighting
and choice set dependence as two mutually exclusive frameworks leading to two correspond-
ing major classes of decision theories. Our results show, however, that both play a role for
all subjects, although to a varying degree. Knowing about the relative importance of prob-
ability weighting and choice set dependence could thus inspire new decision theories taking
both frameworks into account and lead to better predictions in various important domains
of risk taking behavior, such as investment, asset pricing, insurance, and health behavior.
The conclusions also open up avenues for future research. First, our methodology could be
used to study how the relative importance of probability weighting and choice set dependence
varies with educational background, cognitive ability, and other socio economic characteris-
tics in the general population. This could lead to new explanations for the observed variation
in socio economic outcomes as the different types may fall pray to distinct behavioral traps
during their lives. Second, while these results are valid out-of-sample within the domain of
risky choices, it would also be interesting to know how far they extend to other domains in
which choice set dependence plays a role too, such as consumer, voter, intertemporal, and
judicial choices.
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A Structural Estimations at the Aggregate Level
Table 4: Structural Estimations at the Aggregate Level
Specification of Decision Theory EUT CPT CPT2a ST
Concavity of utility function (β) 0.125∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗
(0.010)∗∗∗ (0.045)∗∗∗ (0.038)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗
Likelihood sensitivity (α) 0.681◦◦◦ 0.692◦◦◦
(0.027)∗∗∗ (0.030)∗∗∗
Net index of convexity (γ) 0.962◦∗∗
(0.020)∗∗∗
Degree of local thinking (δ) 0.931◦◦◦
(0.008)∗∗∗
Choice sensitivity (σ) 0.020∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.044)∗∗∗ (0.041)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
Number of subjects 283∗∗∗ 283∗∗∗ 283∗∗∗ 283∗∗∗
Number of observations 23,316∗∗∗ 23,316∗∗∗ 23,316∗∗∗ 23,316∗∗∗
Log Likelihood -12,714.52∗∗∗ -12,386.13∗∗∗ -12,382.20∗∗∗ -12,650.83∗∗∗
AIC 25,433.03∗∗∗ 24,778.25∗∗∗ 24,772.39∗∗∗ 25,307.65∗∗∗
BIC 25,449.15∗∗∗ 24,802.42∗∗∗ 24,804.62∗∗∗ 25,331.82∗∗∗
Subject cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significantly different from 0 (1) at the
1% level: ∗∗∗ (◦◦◦); at the 5% level: ∗∗ (◦◦); at the 10% level: ∗ (◦)
a
CPT2 is a specification also based on Cumulative Prospect Theory but uses the more flexible, two-
parameter version of the probability weighting function by Prelec (1998): w(p) = exp(−γ(− ln(p))α),
where γ is the net index of concavity.
Table 4 reveals that, at the aggregate level, all decision models fit the subjects’ choices
considerably worse than the fintie mixture model (Table 3) which accounts for heterogeneity
in a parsimonious way. Compared to the estimations at the aggregate level, the finite mixture
model not only achieves a higher log likelihood but also lower values of the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
Moreover, the alternative specification of Cumulative Prospect Theory, CPT2, using the
more flexible, two-parameter version of Prelec’s probability weighting function exhibits only
a negligibly better fit than the baseline specification of CPT. This is because the estimated
net index of concavity, γˆ = 0.962, is very close to one. Thus, we opt for the baseline
specification of CPT, as it exhibits the same number of parameters as ST and RT.
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Table 5: Structural Estimations at the Aggregate Level (continued)
Specification of Decision Theory RTb RT2c
Concavity of utility function (β) 0.917∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.036)∗∗∗
Exponent of regret function (ζ) 0.477◦◦◦
(0.018)∗∗∗
Convexity of regret function (ξ) 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001)∗∗∗
Choice sensitivity (σ) 0.061∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.054)∗∗∗
Number of subjects 283∗∗∗ 283∗∗∗
Number of observations 23,316∗∗∗ 23,316∗∗∗
Log Likelihood -13,452.20∗∗∗ -13,320.20∗∗∗
AIC 26,910.40∗∗∗ 26,646.39∗∗∗
BIC 26,934.57∗∗∗ 26,670.56∗∗∗
Subject cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significantly different from 0 (1) at the 1% level: ∗∗∗ (◦◦◦); at the 5%
level: ∗∗ (◦◦); at the 10% level: ∗ (◦)
b
RT denotes a specification of Regret Theory with a power regret
function: r(x) = xζ if x ≥ 0, otherwise r(x) = −(−x)ζ .
c
RT2 denotes a specification of Regret Theory with an exponential
regret function: r(x) = exp(ξ x)
Table 5 shows that Regret Theory fits aggregate choices only poorly. Regardless of the
applied specification – RT or RT2 – it achieves a lower log likelihood and inferior values of the
AIC and the BIC than any of the other decision theories reported in Table 4. Consequently,
we opt for ST as our benchmark for choice set dependence.
B Common Ratio Allais Paradox
We now use an example of two lotteries, X and Y , that may induce the Common Ratio
Allais Paradox:
X =
 6000 p = 12q0 1− p = 1− 1
2
q
vs. Y =
 3000 q0 1− q
In this example, the Common Ratio Allais Paradox refers to the empirical finding that if p
is high most individuals prefer Y over X, whereas if p is scaled down by a factor 0 < λ < 1
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individuals prefer X over Y for a sufficiently small λ.
B.1 EUT
EUT cannot describe the Common Ratio Allais Paradox in the above example. The decision
maker evaluates lotteryX as V EUT (X) = p v(6000)+(1−p) v(0) and lottery Y as V EUT (Y ) =
2p v(3000) + (1− 2p) v(0) . The decision maker chooses lottery X over Y if
V EUT (X) > V EUT (Y )
p v(6000) > 2p v(3000)− p v(0)
v(6000) > 2v(3000)− v(0) .
Hence, the choice does not depend on the value of the probability p.
B.2 CPT
CPT can describe the Common Ratio Allais Paradox in the above example. The decision
maker prefers lottery Y over X if
V CPT (Y ) > V CPT (X)
w(q) v(3000) + [1− w(q)] v(0) > w(p) v(6000) + [1− w(p)] v(0)
w(q)
w(p)
>
v(6000)− v(0)
v(3000)− v(0) .
Note that when p is scaled down by the factor λ, the right hand side of the above inequality
remains unchanged, while the left hand side decreases due to the probability weighting
function’s subproportionality, i.e. w(q)
w(p)
> w(λq)
w(λp)
. Hence, for a sufficiently low λ the sign of
the above inequality may change, and the decision maker prefers X to Y and exhibits the
Common Ratio Allais Paradox.
B.2.1 ST
ST can describe the Common Ratio Allais Paradox in the above example when the two
lotteries’ payoffs are independent. In this case, there are four states of the world which rank
in salience as follows: σ(6000, 0) > σ(0, 3000) > σ(6000, 3000) > σ(0, 0). Hence, the decision
maker evaluates lottery X as
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V ST (X|{X, Y }) = [piST1 (6000, 0) + piST3 (6000, 3000)] v(6000)
+
[
piST2 (0, 3000) + pi
ST
4 (0, 0)
]
v(0) .
and
V ST (Y |{X, Y }) = [piST2 (0, 3000) + piST3 (6000, 3000)] v(3000)
+
[
piST1 (6000, 0) + pi
ST
4 (0, 0)
]
v(0) .
Using v(0) = 0 and the decision weights given by equation (1), the decision maker prefers
Y over X when
v(3000) [δ(1− p)q + δ2pq] > v(6000) [p(1− q) + δ2pq]
v(3000) 2δ [1− p(1− δ)] > v(6000) [1− 2p(1− δ2)]
1− p(1− δ)
1− 2p(1− δ2) >
v(6000)
2δv(3000)
.
Note that when p is scaled down, the right hand side of the above inequality remains un-
changed, while the left hand side decreases. Hence, for a sufficiently low λ the sign of
the above inequality may change, and the decision maker prefers X to Y and exhibits the
Common Ratio Allais Paradox.
However, when the two lotteries are correlated, ST can no longer describe the Common
Ration Allais Paradox. In this case, there are just three states of the world:
ps p p 1− 2p
xs 6000 0 0
ys 3000 3000 0
The ranking in terms of salience of these three states is as follows: σ(0, 3000) > σ(6000, 3000) >
σ(0, 0). Hence, the decision maker evaluates lottery X as
V ST (X|X, Y ) = piST2 (6000, 3000) v(6000) +
[
piST1 (0, 3000) + pi
ST
3 (0, 0)
]
v(0)
and evaluates lottery Y as
V ST (Y |X, Y ) = [piST1 (0, 3000) + piST2 (6000, 3000)] v(3000) + piST3 (0, 0) v(0)
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Using v(0) = 0 and the decision weights given by equation (1), the decision maker prefers
X over Y when
v(6000) δp > v(3000) (δp+ p)
v(6000) δp > v(3000) (δp+ p)
v(6000)
v(3000)
>
1 + δ
δ
.
Hence, regardless of the value of p, the decision maker always prefers X over Y when the
above inequality holds, and otherwise always prefers Y over X. Consequently, the decision
maker never exhibits the Common Ratio Allais Paradox when the lotteries’ payoffs are
correlated.
C Choices to Trigger the Common Ratio Allais Para-
dox
The binary choices that may trigger the Common Ratio Allais Paradox are based on a subset
of a 3× 3× 2 design. The design uses the following three different payoff levels:
Payoff Level 1: X =
 6000 p = 12q0 1− p = 1− 1
2
q
vs. Y =
 3000 q0 1− q
Payoff Level 2: X =
 5500 p = 12q500 1− p = 1− 1
2
q
vs. Y =
 3000 q500 1− q
Payoff Level 3: X =
 7000 p = 12q1000 1− p = 1− 1
2
q
vs. Y =
 4000 q1000 1− q
The design features three different probability levels q ∈ {0.90, 0.80, 0.70}. To trigger the
Common Ratio Allais Paradox each of these three probability levels is scaled down: 0.90 is
scaled down to 0.02, 0.80 to 0.10, and 0.70 to 0.20. From the resulting 18 binary choices this
design generates, we exclude 3 binary choices which we use for triggering preference reversals
and making out-of-sample predictions (see Appendix D).
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D Choices to Trigger Preference Reversals
The six binary choices that may trigger preference reversals are based on the following
lotteries X˜ and Y˜ :
Choice 1: X˜ =
 400 p = 0.960 1− p = 0.04 vs. Y˜ =
 1600 q = 0.240 1− q = 0.76
Choice 2: X˜ =
 1600 p = 0.240 1− p = 0.76 vs. Y˜ =
 6400 q = 0.060 1− q = 0.94
Choice 3: X˜ =
 400 p = 0.960 1− p = 0.04 vs. Y˜ =
 6400 q = 0.060 1− q = 0.94
Choice 4: X˜ =
 3000 p = 0.900 1− p = 0.10 vs. Y˜ =
 6000 q = 0.450 1− q = 0.55
Choice 5: X˜ =
 3000 p = 0.700 1− p = 0.30 vs. Y˜ =
 6000 q = 0.350 1− q = 0.65
Choice 6: X˜ =
 3000 p = 0.200 1− p = 0.80 vs. Y˜ =
 6000 q = 0.100 1− q = 0.90
The first three binary choices are similar to the ones stated in Bordalo et al. (2012b).
The last three binary choices are based on Payoff Level 1 of the 3 × 3 × 2 design used for
generating choices that may trigger the Common Ratio Allais Paradox (see Appendix C).
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E Clean Classification of Subjects into Types
Figure 7: Distribution of Ex-Post Probabilities of Type-Membership
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The figure shows the distribution of the subjects’ individual ex post-probabilities of type-membership, τiM ,
according to Equation (4). The resulting classification of subjects into types is clean as for nearly all subjects
these post-probabilities of type-membership are either close to 0 or 1.
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